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Abstract The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC)
is one of the largest transnational governance schemes
(TGSs). Its success or failure, however, is a matter of
debate. Drawing on research in cognitive linguistics, we
argue that when evaluators discuss the UNGC, they apply
the metaphorical concept of the family: the UNGC corre-
sponds to the ‘‘family,’’ the UNGC headquarter to the
‘‘parent’’ and the business participants of the UNGC to the
‘‘children’’ of the family. As a corollary, evaluators’
implicit understanding of how a family is best organized
sets different benchmarks against which the governance
structure of the UNGC is assessed. We describe two ideal
models of ‘‘educating’’ UNGC business participants. Crit-
ics of the UNGC adopt a ‘‘strict father’’ model of trans-
national governance based on the idea that the proper
education of inherently ‘‘bad’’ business firms necessitates
obedience, discipline and punishment in case firms are non-
compliant. In contrast, the UNGC’s advocates follow a
‘‘nurturant parent’’ model, which prioritizes empathy,
learning and nurturance to support the moral development
of ‘‘good’’ business firms. We develop the ‘‘UNGC-as-
family’’ metaphor, explore its implications for transna-
tional governance and discuss under what conditions these
idealized models can serve as appropriate guidelines for
TGSs. Specifically, we posit that following the behavioral
prescriptions of the ‘‘strict father’’ model may, under cer-
tain conditions, jeopardize the organizational embedding
and institutionalization of UNGC principles, and explain
when and why it may be in the best interest of the UNGC
and civil society to embrace the instructions of the ‘‘nur-
turant parent’’ model of transnational governance.
Keywords Evaluators  Metaphor  Social judgment
formation  Transnational governance  United Nations
Global Compact
Introduction
Because of its large membership base and the scope of its
activities, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) has
attracted significant attention in the recent past (Rasche and
Kell 2010; Rasche et al. 2013). However, expert ‘‘evalua-
tors’’ of the UNGC, such as policy makers, academics, civil
society activists and UNGC officials, differ markedly in
their assessment of whether the UNGC actually helps
corporate social responsibility (CSR) become effectively
embedded in business firms participating in the UNGC.
Moreover, whether the design of the UNGC is appropriate
to its purpose has been subject to significant debate (e.g.,
Crane and Matten 2013; Rasche 2009). On the one hand,
many critics (e.g., Deva 2006; Nason 2008) find that the
UNGC has little impact on business operations and main-
tain that participation merely amounts to a public relations
exercise that allows business signatories to ‘‘bluewash’’
unsustainable practices—that is, to unduly benefit from the
legitimacy of the UN (blue being the color associated with
the UN), without implementing UNGC prescriptions. In
this vein, Sethi and Schepers (2014) argue that participa-
tion in the UNGC has not enhanced company performance
and question the legitimacy and sustained existence of the
UNGC. On the other hand, advocates of the UNGC point
out that transnational governance is characterized by the
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absence of traditional state-based mechanisms with cen-
tralized authority and therefore requires the ‘‘orchestra-
tion’’ of polycentric networks composed of both public and
private actors (Abbott and Snidal 2010); according to
advocates, the ‘‘soft’’ and consensual approach of the
UNGC constitutes a ‘‘necessary supplement’’ to regulatory
approaches (Rasche 2009) and offers an appropriate form
of global organizing (Palazzo and Scherer 2010; Scherer
and Palazzo 2011).
What explains the contested legitimacy of the UNGC?
Which assessment of the UNGC is accurate and which
policy measures are appropriate to the context of transna-
tional governance, that is, how can companies that join the
UNGC be induced to actually implement and live up to the
policies and principles enshrined in the UNGC? Moreover,
how can we enable the UNGC and other transnational
governance schemes (TGSs) to make the world economy
more sustainable and prevent these from merely serving as
a fig leaf for the unethical practices of business firms? The
question of the contested nature and legitimacy of TGSs
such as the UNGC is far from trivial, considering that
TGSs have a profound impact on local communities and
the environment (Scherer and Palazzo 2011). Furthermore,
because the interorganizational networks of TGSs and
other forms of global organization challenge extant theo-
ries of organizing and social judgment formation, gaining a
better theoretical understanding of these entities and the
processes underlying their emergence will help build the
theoretical foundations of this important, yet largely und-
erresearched area (Djelic and Quack 2008; Haack et al.
2014).
The purpose of our article is twofold. First, by theorizing
the deeper conceptual structure underlying the reasoning of
evaluators, we seek to explain why the UNGC’s nature is
so intensely contested. Unlike the mechanisms of state
governance, TGSs, as well as their organizational struc-
tures, procedures, and outcomes, are as yet poorly under-
stood (Djelic and Quack 2008; Stone 2008). Drawing on
research in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff 1996, 2008; Lak-
off & Johnson 1980) and organization theory (Cornelissen
2004; Schoeneborn et al. 2013), we argue that in order to
make sense of the complexities of TGSs, evaluators often
automatically apply concepts from domains they are more
familiar with. That is, the conceptual structure underlying
evaluators’ reasoning about TGSs such as the UNGC is to a
large extent metaphorical. This means that conceptual
domains of primary experience with which the evaluator is
more familiar co-occur with and are projected on more
abstract domains with which the evaluator is less familiar.
Specifically, we suggest that the target domain of the
UNGC is organized and therefore understood in terms of
the source domain of ‘‘family,’’ where the governing
individual (the UNGC leadership) is a ‘‘parent’’ and those
governed (the business participants) are the ‘‘children’’
(Lakoff 2008). The ‘‘UNGC-as-family’’ metaphor serves as
an important heuristic in the assessment of the UNGC and
represents a baseline concept that is common among
UNGC evaluators. Importantly, UNGC evaluators have
different ideas on how a family is best organized. These
differences give rise to distinct ideals against which the
governance structure of the UNGC is judged. UNGC critics
follow a ‘‘strict father’’ model of transnational governance,
where the authority figure of the father knows a priori what
is right and what is wrong, and advocates discipline, obe-
dience and punishment in case children do wrong. In the
view of the strict father model, punishment and negative
sanctions will strengthen the ‘‘character’’ of business par-
ticipants and thereby make it likelier that these participants
will implement UNGC principles (Deva 2006; Sethi and
Schepers 2014). In contrast, UNGC advocates follow a
‘‘nurturant parent’’ model of transnational governance,
which foresees that both parents resume responsibility for
raising the offspring, but are aware that—in a world of
unanticipated social challenges—they do not know a priori
what the right course of action is. The model therefore
emphasizes the role of exploration and experimentation as
necessary prerequisites for children to learn and develop a
capacity for creativity, self-discipline and reflection, and,
by analogy, stipulates that companies that sign the UNGC
must not be overburdened with requirements but need time
and leeway to learn about the implementation of CSR
policies (Christensen et al. 2013; Palazzo and Scherer
2010).
The second goal of our article is to critically assess the
analysis of the UNGC by Sethi and Schepers (2014). We
treat their article as a prototypical example of how the strict
father model of transnational governance is manifested in
the way in which UNGC critics think and talk about the
UNGC. While the strict father ideal is intuitively appeal-
ing, as embodied in the work of Sethi and Schepers (2014),
we point to its inherent limitations in the context of het-
erogeneous legal and moral expectations which are char-
acteristic for a globalized economy (Scherer and Palazzo
2008, 2011). We clarify that in the highly complex and
dynamic setting of transnational governance, it is often
difficult to establish the authority of a ‘‘strict father’’ who
knows a priori what is right and what is wrong. Enforcing a
single ‘‘truth’’ with respect to CSR is problematic, as a
standardized approach will be of little use in the context of
fragmented institutional expectations (Kostova et al. 2008;
Scherer et al. 2013). In fact, following the behavioral
prescriptions of the strict father model may stall the process
of institutionalizing CSR, as imposing moral strength and
discipline forgoes the opportunity to make ‘‘small wins’’
(Weick 1984) and alienates those business firms that most
urgently need to be influenced; namely business
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participants that lag behind in the implementation of CSR
(Haack et al. 2012; Wickert and Schaefer 2014). By con-
trast, following the ‘‘nurturant parent’’ model acknowl-
edges that transnational governance is a social process that
defies easy solutions premised on authority and immediate
control (Scherer 2003). We outline two self-reinforcing
social mechanisms, ‘‘moral entrapment’’ and ‘‘upward
competition,’’ to elucidate the beneficial consequences of
acting in accordance with the instructions of the nurturant
parent model. The first mechanism describes the phenom-
enon that business firms who publicly commit to uphold
the principles enshrined in a particular TGS can become
‘‘morally entrapped’’ as the awareness of being publically
observed will pressure them to enact their promises
(Christensen et al. 2013; Haack et al. 2012; Risse 2000).
The second mechanism refers to the growing competition
for social approval among TGS participants which pushes
them to increase their implementation efforts, leading to a
‘‘ratcheting up’’ effect (Cashore et al. 2007; Overdevest
2010). In the context of the UNGC, this process is driven by
the arrival of public comparison on the basis of certain cri-
teria (e.g., quality of reporting) that the UNGC leadership,
investors and other evaluators make among business par-
ticipants (Baccaro and Mele 2011). Importantly, we shall
elaborate that the greater the number of business firms par-
ticipating in the UNGC, the greater is the likelihood that the
two social mechanisms take effect, illustrating the merit of
low entry barriers and few requirements to help establish a
‘‘critical mass’’ of UNGC participants (Bremer 2008).
Overall, our article contributes to the growing literature
on transnational governance and the UNGC in two ways.
First, it theorizes the fundamental role of metaphors in the
formation of social judgments in the context of TGSs such
as the UNGC. Second, disclosing the tensions of the
UNGC-as-family metaphor offers heuristic value and cre-
ates a novel understanding of the UNGC that goes beyond
the existing literal accounts of transnational governance.
Specifically, the article clarifies that following the pre-
scriptions of the strict father may jeopardize the prospects
of organizational learning and UNGC implementation as it
cuts off the self-reinforcing process of public scrutiny, peer
pressure and ‘‘creeping’’ commitment which is constitutive
of the institutionalization of CSR at a global scale.
The Role of Conceptual Metaphor In Judging
Transnational Governance and the UNGC
In this section, we develop our arguments on the UNGC-
as-family metaphor in detail. We will begin by theorizing
that evaluators perceive TGSs as families that have one
head and various family members. We will go on to
describe the basic assumptions underlying the ‘‘strict
father’’ and ‘‘nurturant parent’’ models of transnational
governance, outlining each model’s behavioral prescrip-
tions in the context of the UNGC.
The UNGC-as-Family Metaphor
Scholars tend to subscribe to either of the two dominant
perspectives on the appropriate design of TGSs. The first
view advocates, often implicitly, that transnational gover-
nance should be structured along the lines of national
governance and that its representatives should be endowed
with the regulatory capacities of a centralized authority
(e.g., Schepers 2011; Sethi and Schepers 2014). The second
view stresses the need for voluntary self- or co-regulation,
pointing out that traditional state-based mechanisms with
centralized authority do not operate on a global scale and
that, consequently, effective global regulation requires the
collaboration between public and private actors (e.g.,
Abbott and Snidal 2010; Scherer and Palazzo 2011). These
conceptual antipodes in the scholarly discourse on trans-
national governance are manifested in conceptual distinc-
tions such as ‘‘hard law’’ (characterized by explicit and
legally binding obligations with a clear delegation of
authority) versus ‘‘soft law’’ (characterized by the absence
of hard law) (Abbott and Snidal 2000) or ‘‘strong-sword
programs’’ (TGSs based on monitoring, public disclosure
and sanctioning mechanisms) versus ‘‘weak-sword pro-
grams’’ (TGSs which lack public disclosure and sanction-
ing mechanisms) (Potoski and Prakash 2005). Furthermore,
authors have distinguished ‘‘governance by government’’
(hierarchical steering by public actors in a command-and-
control approach) from ‘‘governance with government’’
(non-hierarchical coordination which involves both public
and private actors) and ‘‘governance without government’’
(non-hierarchical coordination that involves only private
actors) (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2010; Rosenau and Czempiel
1992). Finally, these differences are also reflected in the
disagreement on how to nurture ethical behavior and rule-
following within organizations such as business firms.
Views range from the logic of ‘‘compliance,’’ according to
which the employees’ behavior is controlled in a top-down
fashion by precise rules about ‘‘dos and don’ts,’’ surveil-
lance systems and sanctions, to the logic of ‘‘integrity,’’
according to which employees follow general principles
and policies, rather than detailed prescriptions, and are
trained to apply their own judgments to moral challenges
in situations that often cannot be anticipated due to com-
plex and dynamic environments (Paine 1994). The dis-
tinction between compliance-based and value-based ethics
programs points to a similar direction (Stansbury and Barry
2007).
We posit that the conceptual distinctions described
above can be grounded in the theory of conceptual
A Critique of the ‘‘Strict Father’’ Model 227
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metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). The basic premise of
the conceptual metaphor theory is that a metaphor is not
only a linguistic device but also has a profound impact on
how evaluators conceptualize and behave with respect to
the evaluated entity. According to this view, metaphor
refers to cross-domain mappings between conceptual
domains, i.e., the correspondence of what is referred to as a
‘‘source domain’’ onto a so-called target domain (Evans
and Green 2006). Specifically, evaluators draw inferences
from a cognitively familiar area (the source domain) to
better comprehend a cognitively less familiar area (the
target domain). These mappings are often ‘‘embodied’’ due
to preconceptual experiences (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).
For instance, evaluators have been found to draw on the
concept of ‘‘space’’ to comprehend the more abstract
concept of ‘‘time,’’ such as in ‘‘we are looking forward to a
brighter tomorrow’’ or ‘‘falling behind schedule’’ (Boro-
ditsky 2000, p. 4). Likewise, organization theory scholars
have suggested that thinking and speaking of organization
and organizing is inherently metaphorical in nature (Cor-
nelissen 2004, 2005; Schoeneborn et al. 2013), as exem-
plified by the use of anthropomorphic metaphors to
describe organizational characteristics and functions, such
as in the ‘‘organizational identity’’ and the ‘‘learning
organization’’ metaphors (Cornelissen 2005).
We extend this research in cognitive linguistics and orga-
nization theory to the analysis of evaluators’ assessments of
TGSs such as the UNGC. By ‘‘evaluators,’’ we refer to various
categories of observers who possess expert knowledge on
TGSs and who have a personal interest in TGSs and their
activities, such as academics, global policy makers, TGS
officials, journalists and civil society activists (Haack et al.
2014). Given this definition, we perceive ourselves as ‘‘eval-
uators of evaluators,’’ or as ‘‘second-order’’ evaluators who in
the first part of the paper seek to theorize on the conceptual
base underlying the reasoning of ‘‘first-order’’ evaluators of
TGSs, such as Sethi and Schepers (2014). At the same time, in
the paper’s second part, we partly operate as ‘‘first-order’’
evaluators in that we also judge the appropriateness of UNGC
design. We use the term ‘‘transnational’’ to define interactions
that span across national borders and, in contrast to agree-
ments strictly between public actors, also include a range of
private actors such as non-governmental organizations and
business firms (Keohane and Nye 1974). In turn, the concept
of TGS covers the self- or co-regulation of global policy
issues, where the participant organizations that comprise an
overarching TGS network may develop, negotiate and enforce
such regulations as well as provide global public goods, either
in hybrid public–private partnerships or in associations
between private actors without the support of public authori-
ties (Haack et al. 2014).
In previous research (Haack et al. 2014), we distin-
guished evaluators from ‘‘intuiters,’’ members of the public
who lack the expertise and motivation to evaluate TGSs
and their characteristics actively and therefore apply heu-
ristics to judge the legitimacy of TGSs. At the same time,
we emphasized that the evaluator and intuiter concept
represent two ideal types of social judgment processes and
discussed the possibility that observers can switch between
an evaluator and intuiter mode of judgment (Kahneman
2011; Tost 2011). That is, an intuiter may turn into an
evaluator who deliberates carefully about a specific TGS.
Likewise, an evaluator may turn into an intuiter who
abstains from applying purely theoretical reasoning and
instead draws on heuristics to make their judgment about a
specific TGS. In the context of the present paper, we posit
that expert evaluators often act as intuiters who draw on
judgmental heuristics especially when their assessments
and worldviews have become taken-for-granted and men-
tally entrenched (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Specifi-
cally, we suggest that first-order evaluators draw inferences
about complex forms of global organizing such as the
UNGC by means of applying conceptual metaphors in
judgment tasks.
Our rationale is particularly informed by research by the
cognitive linguist Lakoff (1996, 2008) who suggested that
the conceptual domain of ‘‘family’’ plays a highly influ-
ential role in understanding and evaluating the target
domain of ‘‘governing institution.’’ He defines ‘‘institu-
tion’’ as ‘‘a structured, publicly recognized social group
that persists over time,’’ and ‘‘governing’’ as ‘‘setting
expectations and giving directives, and making sure they
are carried out by positive or negative means’’ (Lakoff
2008, p. 85). Lakoff (2008) suggests that this conceptual
metaphor is very powerful because evaluators experience
governance for the first time during childhood and in the
context of their family, where their parents mentor and
educate them, tell them what to do and how to do it, e.g.,
making the bed and finishing their dinner. The correlation
between early experiences of governance and family
becomes embodied and forms a conceptual association that
evaluators draw on in their reasoning and judgments later
in life (Bougher 2012). In view of this, we suggest that the
belief systems and mental schemata of expert evaluators of
the UNGC, including the contributors to this Thematic
Symposium, are structured, at least partly, around an
overarching conceptual metaphor, namely that of the
‘‘UNGC-as-family’’ metaphor. We propose that the family
metaphor is the most basic concept evaluators draw on to
judge TGS design and is key to understanding and trou-
bleshooting the way in which TGSs function. According to
this metaphor, the interorganizational network of TGSs is
conceived of as a family with a ‘‘family head’’ and ‘‘family
members.’’ In the context of this metaphor, the UNGC
leadership, as the ‘‘governing individual,’’ functions as the
‘‘family head,’’ whereas those being governed—the
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business participants in the UNGC—function as the
‘‘children’’ of the family. Table 1 provides a summary
overview of the UNGC-as-family metaphor.
Significantly, the evaluators’ understanding of how a
family is best organized gives rise to specific ideals and
expectations, against which they assess a specific TGS.
Hence, for the context of the UNGC, we posit that a spe-
cific ‘‘family ideal’’ is projected onto the target domain of
the UNGC from which evaluators draw an idealized con-
ception of UNGC governance. Evaluators compare the
ideal to actual instances of governance, e.g., they consider
how the UNGC responds to their concept of wrongdoing on
part of business participants. These operations occur often
automatically and form the basis for subsequent judgments.
Specifically, if these idealized prescriptions are met, eval-
uators grant legitimacy to the UNGC. In contrast, when-
ever the TGS’s observed behavior is not congruent with the
standards embodied by the ideal, evaluators do not grant
legitimacy. In case of severe transgressions, evaluators
disapprove of the TGS and confer ‘‘negative legitimacy’’ or
‘‘illegitimacy’’ (Haack et al. 2014). In other words, the
different ideals of various evaluators set different bench-
marks against which the appropriateness of the UNGC or
another particular TGS is assessed. Hence, in the context of
the UNGC, on which we focus, identifying and describing
these different ideals is a crucial step to understanding why
the nature of this particular TGS is so fiercely contested.
Following works in cognitive linguistics on biconcep-
tualism in political reasoning (Lakoff 1996, 2008), we
propose that evaluators contemplate transnational gover-
nance in terms of two different ideals, i.e., the ‘‘strict
father’’ and the ‘‘nurturant parent’’ ideal. The strict father
model assumes that raising a child appropriately requires
the authority of a ‘‘strict father’’ who ‘‘knows’’ what is
right and what is wrong, as opposed to children who do not
know right from wrong. The strict father needs to be
obeyed, and children need to be punished if they do wrong
or do not heed the rules of the father. In contrast, the
nurturant parent model does not assume the single
authority figure of a strict father, but that of two parents
with equal responsibility who help their children under-
stand why there are ‘‘dos and don’ts’’ and how these are
formed, without predetermining what the right course of
action is. While in the strict father model the range of
accepted behavior is restricted a priori, the nurturant parent
model leaves room for maneuver and experimentation. We
explicate the two models in further detail below. The two
models represent diametrically opposed worldviews, and
evaluators holding these models will make very different
recommendations with respect to TGS design and business
regulation. Table 2 summarizes important assumptions and
prescriptions of the two idealized models of transnational
governance.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, providing a few
clarifying explanations may be helpful at this point. First,
the strict father and nurturant parent models are idealized
conceptions of family life, meaning that holding a partic-
ular type of family model is not necessarily related to how
evaluators were actually raised. In fact, evaluators may
hold a family ideal in response to an opposed parenting
style which they once resisted (Lakoff 2008). Furthermore,
in reality, families do not represent a binary category but
can be classified along a continuum where actual instances
of family life encompass elements of both the strict father
and the nurturant parent model. Nevertheless, we stick to
the ‘‘binary’’ view of family as it allows us to parsimoni-
ously build theory on the antecedents of social judgment
formation in transnational governance.
Table 1 The UNGC-as-family metaphor
Target domain Source domain
The governing institution [the UNGC] The family
The governing individual [the UNGC leadership] The parent
Those governed [the business participants] The children
Table 2 The strict father versus the nurturant parent ideal of trans-
national governance
Strict father Nurturant parent
Moral basis Strength, authority,
purity
Nurturance, empathy,
partnership
Key
assumptions
Business firms are
naturally bad
Business firms are
naturally good
Because of the firms’
inherent weakness,
they need to be
controlled and
disciplined
Firms can be made
better through support
and nurturance
The strict father knows a
priori what is right and
what is wrong and
teaches firms to
comply with absolute
rules
The nurturant parent is
aware of the
complexity of the
world and teaches
firms to cope with this
complexity
Prescriptions Administer punishment
in cases of wrongdoing
Provide time for
exploration and
experimentation
Assessment of
promise–
performance
gap
Negative, because TGS
principles are not
implemented
Positive, because
business firms can
make sense of
implementation
Approach Static, backward looking Dynamic, forward
looking
Examples UNGC critics: Deva
(2006), Sethi and
Schepers (2014)
UNGC advocates:
Palazzo and Scherer
(2010), Rasche (2009)
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Second, we cannot prove that the cognition of evaluators
is structured around the UNGC-as-family metaphor as our
article does not look into the heads of evaluators by means
of psychological or neuroscientific methods. Nevertheless,
our analysis is consistent with growing conceptual and
empirical evidence that metaphors shape the evaluators’
most basic understanding of their experience with their
social and physical environment (Evans and Green 2006).
Specifically, evaluators have been found to use inference
patterns from the conceptual domain of the family to rea-
son about the conceptual domain of governing institutions
(Lakoff 1996, 2008). While there are other governing
institutions that evaluators are familiar with, and which can
produce alternative metaphors for the UNGC, including the
market, the state or networks, Lakoff (2008) suggests that
the family domain has a much stronger foundation in
experience than the other domains of governance and
therefore amounts to the most basic metaphor in evalua-
tors’ reasoning. Indeed, the pervasiveness of the family
metaphor becomes apparent at the linguistic level, where
governing institutions such as nation states are anthropo-
morphized through expressions relating to family, such as
‘‘Uncle Sam’’ or ‘‘Mother Russia.’’ Likewise, the image of
family is inherent in thinking and speaking in business
terms, such as in ‘‘parent company’’ and ‘‘affiliate’’ in the
context of the interorganizational networks of multi-
national corporations (e.g., Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990;
Kostova and Zaheer 1999).
Finally, the UNGC-as-family metaphor may be per-
ceived to lack precision or ‘‘fit’’ between target and source
domain. Unlike business firms who can choose which
governance scheme they want to engage with, children
cannot select their parents. And in contrast to families,
where one parent gives birth to the child (unless the parents
represent a variant of biological parents, such as adoptive
parents or stepparents), and where children are younger,
weaker and usually command fewer resources than their
parents, in the case of the UNGC and other TGSs, the
business participants have not sprung or issued in any way
from the organization in question. The fact that the UNGC
involve sizeable corporations raises some doubts as to
whether the UNGC-as-family we describe applies uni-
formly to TGSs: arguably, any big business firm (e.g., a
multinational corporation) may be hierarchically a ‘‘child’’
but, if anything, a grown-up child, i.e., an ‘‘adult’’ in the
context of the UNGC-as-family metaphor. Thus, the idea
that, e.g., the UNGC/parent can raise a business firm/child
and form its moral attitudes is not fully meaningful. Fur-
thermore, in terms of size, finances and power, one could
easily argue that many of the business participants of the
UNGC are much bigger, stronger, and older than the
UNGC itself and well beyond their ‘‘formative years.’’ It
follows that from the point of view that target and source
domain lack similarity, the UNGC-as-family metaphor
may not seem entirely plausible. However, extant organi-
zational research has emphasized that metaphors should
generate insights beyond the similarities required for
comprehending the metaphor and argued that the greater
the dissimilarity between target and source domain, the
greater the likelihood that that conceptual metaphor offers
‘‘heuristic value’’ to the theorizing of second-order evalu-
ators (Cornelissen 2004; Schoeneborn et al. 2013). As
elaborated below, the fact that the conceptual domains of
the UNGC-as-family metaphor can be seen as distant from
one another opens up possibilities for offering new and
interesting insights into the domain of transnational
governance.
The Strict Father Ideal
The ideal to which most UNGC critics subscribe, as we
suggest, is based on that of the strict father. As Lakoff
argues (1996, pp. 65–106), the starting point of this model
is the view that the father has the ‘‘primary responsibility
for supporting and protecting the family as well as the
authority to set the overall family policy’’ (pp. 65–66).
This view, according to Lakoff, is based on the assump-
tion that the father knows a priori what is right and what
is wrong. The strict father further presumes that children
are naturally ‘‘bad’’ on the grounds that they want to do
what feels good, irrespective of whether it is ‘‘right.’’
Given their ‘‘weak’’ character, the father ‘‘teaches chil-
dren right from wrong by setting strict rules for their
behavior and enforcing them through punishment’’ (p.
66). Thus, the strict father model is premised on the
notion that administering punishment for violating rules
will teach children to obey those rules, instill them with
respect for legitimate authority and make them more self-
reliant and self-disciplined. In consequence, punishment,
even corporal punishment, is considered to support the
moral development of children, whereas overindulging
children is considered problematic. The proverb ‘‘spare
the rod and spoil the child’’ epitomizes this view
eloquently.
Overall, in the strict father family, the values of strength,
authority and purity have a high priority and form the basis
of appropriate child rearing. By contrast, weakness, dis-
obedience to authority and impurity are regarded as deeply
inappropriate (Lakoff 1996, 2008). This means that in a
strict father family children ought to be well mannered—
for example, to wash their hands before dinner. The idea is
that imposing cleanliness makes children more susceptible
to perceptions of ‘‘purity’’ and thus morality (Lakoff 2008).
Another common attitude is that that children should not
keep bad company, namely friends of doubtful character or
origin.
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Evaluators who embrace the strict father ideal of
transnational governance (‘‘strict fathers’’ hereafter) tend to
hold a negative image of human nature and assume that
managers, business firms and whole industries are involved
in the decoupling of policy and practice; that is, that they
are ‘‘free riders’’ who deliberately shirk responsibility
(Bromley and Powell 2012). In the view of strict fathers,
business firms are ‘‘bad’’ and morally ‘‘weak’’ when they
fail to embed effectively the prescriptions of CSR initia-
tives into their daily activities. Because strength and
authority form the foundation of their morality, strict
fathers believe that compliance with the prescriptions of
TGSs can be improved through the proverbial rod, that is,
negative sanctions and punishment. Strict fathers attribute
shirking responsibility and free riding to low entry barriers
to CSR initiatives, lax enforcement mechanisms, loose
reporting requirements and inadequate or weak governance
structures. In contrast to these, they call for high-entry
barriers, stringent reporting requirements and accountabil-
ity mechanisms and sanctions such as ‘‘delisting’’ non-
compliant business firms (Behnam and MacLean 2011). In
this view, monitoring the actual implementation of CSR
practices helps promote ethical conduct in organizations
and reduce the propensity for free riding and adverse
selection of low-performing companies and thus promotes
the institutionalization of CSR. Overall, strict fathers
regard the commitments of business firms as deceptive
promises and ‘‘cheap talk,’’ and they therefore assess
negatively the gaps between promises and performance,
urging business firms to ‘‘walk the talk’’ (Weick 1995).
Strict fathers are also concerned with ‘‘purity’’ in the
context of transnational governance. Following the logic of
‘‘a bad apple spoils the barrel,’’ they reason that association
with ‘‘bad apples’’ (that is, underperforming or ‘‘tainted’’
companies) can endanger the integrity of a TGS. The risk
of ‘‘contamination’’ necessitates strict measures to prevent
the negative ‘‘spillover’’ of illegitimacy from an under-
performing member to the TGS as a whole (Haack et al.
2014). Such spillovers could ‘‘sully’’ (Sethi and Schepers
2014, this issue) the image and legitimacy of a TGS, and
ultimately jeopardize its ability to acquire resources and
influence to address policy challenges in transnational
governance (Haack 2013). The image of ‘‘purity’’ is per-
vasive in the public discourse on the UNGC, such as in
‘‘cleaning up the Global Compact’’ (The Guardian 2012),
‘‘bluewash’’ (Global Compact Critics 2010) or ‘‘dirty
business’’ (Berne Declaration 2007).
It is obvious that Sethi and Schepers (2014) are guided
by the ‘‘strict father’’ ideal in their assessment of UNGC
governance. Among other points, Sethi and Schepers crit-
icize the lack of influence that the UNGC leadership has
over the UNGC and its business participants, lamenting
that compliance with UNGC principles is not verified and
that business participants do not provide sufficient details
as to how UNGC principles are implemented. In their view,
the procedure of reporting on progress, which requires
participants to disclose their commitment to the UNGC
principles, lacks ‘‘teeth’’ (i.e., strength) and they describe it
as inefficient and ‘‘unworthy of public trust’’ (Sethi and
Schepers 2014, this issue). The integrity and ‘‘purity’’ of
the UNGC are criticized on the grounds of numerous
‘‘worst practices’’ such as the involvement of UNGC par-
ticipant PetroChina in human rights violations and the
controversial nature of the UNGC-sponsored CEO Water
Mandate. Sethi and Schepers (2014) characterize the ‘‘de-
listing’’ procedure as too lenient and imply that the increase
in participant numbers, which the UNGC regards as a sign
of success, can be attributed to the fact that wrongdoers and
underperforming companies can stay in the UNGC without
worrying about negative sanctions. Pessimistically, Sethi
and Schepers (2014, this issue) conclude that since its
launch in 2000, the UNGC has failed to demonstrate any
progress and will ‘‘continue to become wider and shallower
by the day until it runs out of space and depth and becomes
a dry bed of sand.’’
The Nurturant Parent Ideal
In contrast to the strict father model, the ideal that, in our
view, most TGS advocates espouse is the nurturant parent
model (Lakoff 1996, pp. 108–152). The nurturant parent
model is based on nurturance, which in turn requires
empathy and cooperation rather than control and rivalry.
The ‘‘primary experience behind this model is one of being
cared for and cared about, having one’s desires for loving
interactions met, living as happily as possible, and deriving
meaning from mutual interaction and care’’ (Lakoff 1996,
p. 108). The nurturant parent family is not structured as a
family hierarchy culminating in the authority figure of a
father, but as a team, encompassing both a father and a
mother who work together to help their offspring progress
and become self-disciplined and self-reliant citizens. It
rests on the assumption that children are born good and that
it is the responsibility of the parents to be responsive to
their children, to protect them and to support them so that
they grow up well, retaining their innate goodness.
Importantly, in this view, children develop a ‘‘good char-
acter’’ and internalize norms of appropriate behavior pri-
marily through social interaction and by observing others.
Besides learning to take responsibility and to nurture
themselves and others, children should enjoy a childhood
and discover how things work through play. In contrast to
the strict father model, this nurturant parent model argues
that strict discipline and punishment are detrimental to the
cause of child rearing because they often trigger aggres-
siveness and antisocial behavior in children. It furthermore
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maintains that obedience should originate in the children’s
love of their parents and in understanding their parents’
decisions, not in the fear of punishment. The nurturant
parent is aware that proper conduct in life is challenging
within the context of a complex social environment. As
there is no one-size-fits-all recipe for happiness and suc-
cess, children are empowered to deal with contingencies
through continuous learning. In this perspective, children
in their process of maturation need to embrace a high level
of moral consciousness in order to be capable of devel-
oping a reasonable course of action in a complex and
heterogeneous moral environment without the detailed
guidance of their parents or any other authority (Habermas
1990; Kohlberg 1981).
In contrast to strict fathers, proponents of the nurturant
parent model (‘‘nurturant parents’’ hereafter) tend to hold a
positive view of human nature and believe that managers
and business firms generally have a good character. Nur-
turant parents believe that corporate actors have good
intentions but struggle to progress in their CSR efforts and
would therefore benefit from support and learning oppor-
tunities (Palazzo and Scherer 2010; Rasche 2009). Dia-
logue between business firms and civil society actors
facilitates the development of shared understandings of
problems and potential solutions and the type and urgency
of societal expectations with respect to the appropriate
conduct of business firms (Ruggie 2004). Importantly,
according to the view of nurturant parents, for the efforts of
business actors to implement CSR to succeed, these actors
must not be forced to do something that they do not
understand, i.e., they must not be obliged to hurriedly
embrace novel and largely incomprehensible CSR policies
(Christensen et al. 2013; Wickert and Schaefer 2014). It
follows that low entry barriers, lax reporting and
accountability requirements may, in fact, be conducive to
the institutionalization of CSR, because they allow busi-
ness actors sufficient time to understand what they are
supposed to do, which encourages business firms to enact
their promises (Christensen et al. 2013; Haack et al. 2012).
Nurturant parents appreciate or at least tolerate the gap
between promise and performance, which Sethi and
Schepers (2014) criticize in the context of the UNGC,
because it provides business firms with the opportunity to
‘‘talk the walk’’ (Weick 1995) and to experiment ‘‘with the
possibility of becoming good’’ (March 1989, p. 263). That
is, while strict fathers regard decoupling and hypocrisy as
negative, nurturant parents assess it favorably as a neces-
sary stage in the process of enacting CSR prescriptions,
taking the view that troubled companies require encour-
agement and learning opportunities, not discipline and
punishment. Nurturant parents point out that ‘‘delisting’’
underperforming business participants means that the
opportunity to motivate these companies to perform better
in terms of the principles of the TGS to which they sub-
scribe and to engage them in dialogue with other and
potentially more advanced participants is lost (Haack
2013). This signals that, on the whole, nurturant parents are
forward looking and take a dynamic perspective on trans-
national governance, whereas strict fathers tend to be
backward looking and embrace a static view of transna-
tional governance (see Table 2).
Why Transnational Governance Requires Nurturant
Parents, Not Strict Fathers
Lakoff and Johnson remind us that ‘‘truth is always relative
to a conceptual system that is defined in large part by
metaphor’’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, p. 159). For this
reason, it is difficult to judge ‘‘objectively’’ whether the
behavioral prescriptions of either of the models that we
examined earlier—based on the strict father and the nur-
turant parent ideal, respectively—offer an appropriate and
effective path to the closing of the UNGC’s ‘‘promise–
performance gap’’ identified by the strict fathers Sethi and
Schepers (2014). These difficulties notwithstanding, in this
section, we shall argue that there are good reasons for
abiding by the recommendations of the nurturant parent
model and elucidate why the strict father model may
jeopardize a company’s prospects of performing better
with respect to CSR. We gain our insights from unpacking
the tensions contained in the family metaphor, that is, the
imperfect correspondence between the conceptual domains
of the strict father family and the UNGC. Specifically,
after outlining some limitations in Sethi and Scheper’s
analysis, we explain that the strict father family, which is
characterized by clear and explicit rules and an all-know-
ing authority figure, cannot be fully mapped onto the
complex and dynamic setting of transnational governance,
which is characterized by a plethora of heterogeneous
moral and legal expectations with no clear guidance on
how to deal with such ambiguity (Scherer and Palazzo
2011). Therefore, the pivotal premise of the strict father
model is problematic; namely that the enforcement of
absolute rules, control and punishment for non-compliance
will support the implementation of UNGC principles.
Efficient and legitimate solutions to transnational policy
challenges cannot be determined ex ante but need to be
developed in a political and non-hierarchical process
informed by mutual learning and dialogue (Palazzo and
Scherer 2010). Taking this perspective as a starting point,
we explain that transnational policy making should be
guided by the instructions of the nurturant parent model
and go on to outline two social mechanisms to elucidate
the beneficial consequences of acting in accordance with
the instructions of this model.
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What Strict Fathers Fail to Think
Sethi and Schepers (2014) provide a lot of factual evidence
on which they base their criticism. Much of that evidence
appears to be incontrovertible, e.g., on pp. 12–14 where
they very reasonably question the ability of an auditor who
is paid by those who are to be audited to deliver inde-
pendent, objective and valid judgments (a critique which
would also apply to the current business model of auditing
and accounting firms). The authors are also correct in
pointing out that the CEO Water Mandate may illustrate a
case where companies knowingly take advantage of the
UNGC’s stamp of approval to profit at the expense of the
stakeholders who should be protected by the CSR princi-
ples. For instance, the question ‘‘Why are the corporate
sponsors the only legitimate owners of the water issue?’’
(p. 17) is certainly valid, as is the observation ‘‘There is
little room for concern, therefore, for other stakeholders
such as the farmers and villagers who also depend on the
same water for their sustenance and livelihood’’ (p. 17).
This latter remark can also be considered indicative of
Sethi and Schepers’ support for the weakest members of
the global family (to use our basic metaphor); those who,
because of their position in the power hierarchy, are
deprived of a voice and a say in matters that concern them
and may indeed be of vital importance to them. From this
point of view, Sethi and Schepers appear to question the
old-fashioned, hierarchical allocation of power and control
that is related to the strict father model, rather than support
it.
Yet, by and large, Sethi and Schepers (2014) operate as
strict fathers who criticize the ‘‘weaknesses’’ of the UNGC
but abstain from outlining alternatives that ‘‘help’’ the
UNGC to become ‘‘better.’’ Furthermore, while Sethi and
Schepers draw on the salient examples of PetroChina and
the CEO Water Mandate to support their claim that the
UNGC has failed to induce business participants to
increase their CSR efforts, neither do they mention best-
practice examples of successful issue-specific initiatives of
the UNGC (such as the Principles of Responsible Invest-
ment), nor do they allude to instances where the UNGC
tightened its standards (e.g., the case of the Lithuanian
company Lifosa; Global Compact Critics 2011). Surpris-
ingly enough, they also do not discuss the classification of
business participants by performance (the ‘‘differentiation
framework,’’ see UN Global Compact 2010a) nor its pos-
sible implications for the institutional trajectory of the
UNGC (Baccaro and Mele 2011). They furthermore dis-
regard other important developments of the UNGC’s post-
2010 agenda, such as the issue- and sector-specific struc-
turation of the UNGC network and the provision of various
tools and learning opportunities, such as the ‘‘Blueprint for
CSR Leadership’’ (UN Global Compact 2010b) that
support business firms in their efforts to implement the
UNGC’s principles.
Sethi and Schepers (2014, this issue) suggest that ‘‘all
credible and publicly available data and documentation
conclusively demonstrate that the UNGC has failed to
induce its signatory companies to enhance their CSR
efforts and integrate the 10 principles in their policies and
operations.’’ Yet, empirical evidence shows that corporate
signatories do implement the UNGC principles in various
processes and procedures (Baumann-Pauly and Scherer
2013; Baumann-Pauly et al. 2013; Centindamar and Husoy
2007) and that the quality of implementation gradually
improves over time (UN Global Compact 2013a). Simi-
larly, many of the UNGC’s business participants have
advanced the precision and scope of the communication-
on-progress procedure, which, however, according to Sethi
and Schepers (2014, this issue) remains a ‘‘seriously
flawed’’ process. Having analyzed the sustainability reports
of several UNGC participants as consultants ourselves (first
author), we can testify that many participants increasingly
outline some of the key challenges to the implementation
of the UNGC principles and also discuss strategies for
overcoming such challenges. They furthermore communi-
cate how these principles are embedded in their business
operations, which targets they have set for a specific
reporting period and whether the targets of earlier reporting
periods had been achieved. For instance, UNGC participant
British Telecom provides information on the degree to
which benchmarks for non-financial indicators, such as
‘‘workforce diversity,’’ have been met (British Telecom
2011). Aggregate data compiled by the Foundation Gulie´, a
Swiss think tank that provides assessment and bench-
marking services that support the reporting efforts of
UNGC participants, shows that both the comprehensive-
ness and the quality of the information provided in such
reports have significantly improved in the last 6 years
(Guile´ 2013). Specifically, Guile´ (2013, p. 8) observed a
‘‘vast improvement in the clarity of information, but also in
terms of reliability of the information disclosed, due to
systemization of internal and external verification proce-
dures (type audit) to validate the data published.’’ Fur-
thermore, in 2012, the UNGC executive director Georg
Kell announced that henceforward the organization would
be tougher with ‘‘free riders who joined but had no inten-
tion to stay engaged,’’ signaling that in the future, the
UNGC would place greater emphasis on implementation
(The Guardian2012). In sum, we observe that the material
improvements in implementation and reporting described
above are accompanied by equally important changes in
the rhetoric, which indicate that the promise–performance
gap that Sethi and Schepers (2014) identified is narrowing.
The laudable efforts by Sethi and Schepers (2014) to
troubleshoot the UNGC are based on the strict father ideal
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with the a priori presumption of knowing what is right and
what is wrong. This ‘‘moral absolutism’’ (Lakoff 1996,
p. 368) makes it difficult to consider systematically the
social dynamics and complexity that characterize transna-
tional governance, and it disqualifies the use of the strict
father model as a guideline for transnational organizing and
business regulation. Specifically, the ‘‘first-order’’ evalua-
tors Sethi and Schepers do not notice the inherent tension
between the source and target domain of the family met-
aphor. The tension stems from the mismatch of conceptual
domains, that is, the dissimilarity between the strict father
family where a specific set of rules applies uniformly to all
family members for all time (the source domain) and the
unpredictable environment of the UNGC where interests
and expectations of key actors change rapidly and clear
rules are lacking (the target domain). For ‘‘second-order’’
evaluators (evaluators of evaluators) it is evident that fol-
lowing the instructions of the strict father model may be
appropriate in traditional societies defined by the culturally
stable social context, where actors operate in situations of
low complexity and uncertainty and experience and face
relatively homogenous institutional expectations (Scherer
and Palazzo 2011; Scherer et al. 2013). Yet, the global
environment of TGSs is characterized by a high degree of
ambiguity and the prevalence of ‘‘super-wicked problems’’
such as the management of global climate change (Levin
et al. 2012; Rittel and Webber 1973). In such a context, the
strict father model is likely to fail because both its uniform
conceptions and prescriptions will be incompatible with the
fragmented institutional environment of TGSs. Moreover,
it is difficult if not impossible for the strict father to
identify a priori the best possible solution to tackle a par-
ticular transnational challenge or governance gap. There-
fore, as Overdevest and Zeitlin (2014, p. 23) explain, in
transnational governance, ‘‘there is no single, unified body
of hierarchically imposed rules governing a transnational
issue area or policy domain.’’ Rather, what is considered
right and what wrong needs to be determined through
communication and continuous experimentation where
‘‘actors do not know their precise goals or how best to
achieve them ex ante, but must discover both in the course
of problem solving, as well as on a polyarchic or multipolar
distribution of power, where no single actor can enforce a
unilateral solution’’ (Overdevest and Zeitlin (2014, p. 26).
In fact, the unsuccessful attempt by the UN Commission
and Centre of Transnational Corporations to craft binding
regulations for globally operating business firms reveals
that following the instructions of the strict father model has
already failed in the 1970s (Sagafi-nejad 2008).
In the following, we will delineate the antecedents and
consequences of two social mechanisms, ‘‘moral entrap-
ment’’ and ‘‘upward competition’’ to specify that comply-
ing with the behavioral prescriptions of the strict father
model is detrimental to the cause of transnational gover-
nance and the UNGC. On this basis, we will discuss why
nurturance and empathy, which the nurturant parent model
embodies, offer a promising path to increasing a com-
pany’s CSR performance.
Moral Entrapment
The first social mechanism that can lead to superior CSR
performance is ‘‘moral entrapment’’ (Haack et al. 2012) or
‘‘argumentative self-entrapment’’ (Risse 2000, 2004). As a
result of this mechanism, business firms ‘‘talk’’ themselves
into changing their behavior and the organizational reality
through public announcements. In our context, business
firms that pledge publicly to uphold the principles
enshrined in a particular TGS can become ‘‘morally
entrapped.’’ In other words, the knowledge that they will be
held publicly accountable for their behavior may force
them to start enacting their promises. This process is
moderated by various factors, such as the costs of organi-
zational change (Scherer et al. 2013). The lower the costs,
the more likely the TGSs will adapt their behavior and
‘‘walk the talk.’’
The concept of moral entrapment is illustrated in a
recent case study by Haack et al. (2012), who analyzed the
evolution of a principle-based TGS in the field of inter-
national project finance, the Equator Principles Associa-
tion. The authors found that commercial banks that
formally adopted the Equator Principles reacted to the
criticism by civil society by publicly promising to increase
their efforts to implement those principles. Haack et al.
(2012) cite material developments, such as the creation of
new job functions and training programs in specific firms,
and demographic changes in the organizational populace as
tentative evidence that a firm’s promises to reform, even if
initially hypocritical, can have ‘‘real’’ consequences. These
promises, they argue, created a ‘‘creeping commitment’’
that led the financial institutions under study to actually
practice what they preached. Similarly, Christensen et al.
(2013) suggest that ‘‘aspirational talk,’’ i.e., the rhetorical
pledge to reduce the gap between actual and projected
reality, eventually leads CSR to take deeper roots within
organizations. In this view, communication is a formative
activity that constitutes organizational practice: talk pro-
vides ‘‘raw material for (re)constructing the organization’’
(Christensen et al. 2013, p. 376). Thus, although organi-
zations may need to go through a phase of sustained
learning until formally adopted practices come into force
the interaction with ‘‘significant others,’’ i.e., the public at
large, induces a transformation in corporate priorities
which leads to the tighter coupling of policy and practice.
Counterintuitively, the contested practice of greenwashing
may contain the seeds of its own demise and amount
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merely to transitory phenomenon—it may even be a nec-
essary condition for organizational and social change
(Haack et al. 2012; see also Hallett 2010; Tilcsik 2010).
It follows that, in order to increase the impact of moral
entrapment, it is important to maximize the number of
business firms that formally commit to a specific TGS.
Increasing the participation in a TGS will boost its influ-
ence and induce the perception among business partici-
pants that the TGS ‘‘has the right to rule’’ (Buchanan and
Keohane 2006, p. 405). The growing diffusion and recog-
nition of the TGS signals that the principles of this TGS are
valid and ought to be followed, even in the absence of a
traditional authority. In contrast, when a TGS sets high-
entry barriers and strict requirements, only a relatively
small number of business firms will participate in the TGS.
As a result, moral entrapment and creeping commitment
will be limited to a rather small set of companies, and the
TGS will fail to exert influence on the majority of business
firms. A TGS that lacks prominence and pervasiveness will
struggle to achieve the status of validity, and the participant
business firms will be less inclined to internalize and
comply with that TGS’s prescriptions (Haack 2013). It
follows that the prescriptions of the ‘‘strict father’’ model
may erode the prospects of global sustainability.
Thinking about the antecedents and consequences of
moral entrapment, it becomes clear that the UNGC’s
emphasis on ‘‘growth by numbers’’ (Sethi and Schepers
2014, this issue) and its ‘‘20,000 by 2020’’ strategy (i.e., the
objective to reach 20,000 participants by the year 2020;
UN Global Compact 2013c) may represent a highly
effective approach to institutionalizing CSR. In fact, in
order to leverage its principles, the UNGC should increase
its efforts to recruit low-performing companies as such
companies would benefit the most from interaction with
more advanced participants. Furthermore, in order to
increase its impact, the UNGC should also keep its ‘‘bad
apples,’’ even if these negatively affect the overall legiti-
macy of the UNGC (Haack 2013). A lenient and ‘‘soft’’
approach to transnational governance not only gives com-
panies the opportunity to learn and experiment with CSR,
but also allows TGSs to maneuver a larger number of
business firms into moral entrapment. That is, the
requirements of a TGS must be low as only then will
business firms join, which is a necessary (albeit insuffi-
cient) condition for a TGS to be effective (Cashore et al.
2007). Of course, in the conceptual system of strict fathers
such a proposition is non-sensical or ‘‘provocative’’ at best
(Crane and Matten 2013). Embracing greenwashing and
freeriding lets wrongdoers get away with impunity, a
practice that is largely inconsistent with the behavioral
prescriptions of the strict father ideal. Nevertheless, there is
growing evidence that moral entrapment is an important
mechanism that significantly improves CSR performance,
above all in the medium and long term (Christensen et al.
2013; Haack et al. 2012; Wickert and Schaefer 2014).
Building on the above, next we will introduce the con-
cept of ‘‘upward competition’’ and further substantiate the
point that, in the context of transnational governance,
quantitative growth (i.e., an increase in formal commit-
ments) is a necessary condition for qualitative growth (i.e.,
improvement in actual implementation).
Upward Competition
Besides moral entrapment, there is a second social mech-
anism that motivates business firms to increase their efforts
to implement TGS principles, ‘‘upward competition.’’
Upward competition describes the aspiration of business
firms to ‘‘race to the top’’ because of upward pressure on
business practices due to differentiation (Cashore et al.
2007; Overdevest 2010). Differentiation refers to publicly
visible distinctions that TGS evaluators can draw among
the business participants of a TGS, that is, the categories
into which they classify participants on the basis of certain
criteria, such as quality in reporting. For instance, in 2010,
the UNGC, in an effort to accommodate both the protection
of its integrity and the provision of learning opportunities,
introduced a ‘‘differentiation framework’’ with three per-
formance levels of reporting: basic, intermediate and
advanced. This framework was designed ‘‘to help all
companies in the Global Compact improve sustainability
performance and disclosure and to give recognition for
progress made’’ (UN Global Compact 2010a). In the spirit
of the nurturant parent model, the UNGC put a moratorium
on delisting companies from non-OECD/G20 countries on
the grounds that it was difficult for these countries to
provide thorough reports on their implementation efforts
(Haack 2013).
Importantly, the differentiation framework allows for
public comparison and benchmarking which reveals whe-
ther the UNGC’s business participants are low-performing
laggards or high-performing leaders in reporting their
implementation efforts and thus enables TGS evaluators to
better discriminate between good and bad performers
(Baccaro and Mele 2011; Haack et al. 2013; Lee and
Kohler 2010). Differentiation reduces the risk of adverse
selection because it makes it more difficult for free riders
and low-performing companies to exploit the ‘‘legitimacy
commons’’ of a particular TGS, i.e., to benefit from the
legitimacy of the TGS that its participants share by
extension (Haack 2013; Haack et al. 2014; see also Barnett
and King 2008). It follows that the participants that are
identified as leaders have an incentive to take advantage of
their competitive advantage, continue to excel and distin-
guish themselves from laggards, whereas laggards have an
incentive to strive to catch up in order to avoid competitive
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disadvantage and low status (Bo¨rzel et al. 2011). Leaders
will therefore draw attention to the relative differences
among TGS participants whereas laggards try to deflect
these differences, deliberate on their underlying causes,
and scan their environments for innovations and best
practices (Overdevest 2010). Again, these activities are
moderated by the costs of organizational change (Scherer
et al. 2013). The lower the organizational costs of upward
competition, the more easily TNCs will engage in these
efforts. Thus, overall, differentiation leads companies to
‘‘ratchet up’’ their efforts to implement the principles of the
TGS to which they subscribe and narrow the gap between
promises and performance so fiercely criticized by Sethi
and Schepers (2014).
In addition, in the process of upward competition, var-
ious TGSs and TGS sponsors started to enforce transpar-
ency by setting up organizational bodies that make public
the formal commitments of business firms. A case in point
is the launch of the Website ‘‘UN-Business,’’ a web plat-
form where business firms and private sector organizations
document their commitment to advance UN goals und
UNGC principles. These organizations must stipulate time-
bound and measurable targets and include an ‘‘agreement
to publicly disclose, on an annual basis, progress made to
realize the commitment’’ (United Nations 2014a). For
instance, in line with the UNGC’s Education First initiative
(www.globaleducationfirst.org), the Swiss multinational
and UNGC participant Nestle´ announced plans to improve
access to education, providing detailed information on
scope, target and time frame of scheduled activities (United
Nations 2014b). Although it needs to be seen to what extent
business participants are willing to commit publically to
specific and time-bound targets, the UN-Business platform
supports evaluators to hold business participants of the
UNGC accountable to their promises, enhance efforts of
‘‘social vetting’’ (Wynhoven and Stausberg 2010), and
facilitate public benchmarking and comparison within
individual industries and sectors. A similar tendency can be
observed in the case of other principle-based TGSs, such as
the Equator Principles Association, which introduced var-
ious measures related to disclosure and differentiation over
the past few years, such as improved reporting and infor-
mation sharing among participants (Equator Principles
Association 2014).
The beneficial effects of differentiation are enhanced by
evaluators such as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and financial investors, who praise business firms
that score high in the quality of disclosure or pressure
laggards to comply with the UNGC principles (Baccaro
and Mele 2011). The pressuring of UNGC participants by
investors to scale up their implementation efforts (Finan-
cial Times 2010), as well as the 2013 launch of the UN
Global Compact 100 Index, a stock market index of UNGC
participants with superior CSR commitment and profit-
ability (UN Global Compact 2013), are important means of
differentiating between laggards and leaders in the imple-
mentation of the UNGC principles. The LEAD initiative
where highly engaged UNGC participants commit to
implement the UNGC principles at a superior level ‘‘to
reach further, to experiment, to innovate, and to share
learnings,’’ further illustrates the growing scope of differ-
entiation (UN Global Compact 2011). Likewise, NGOs
have made their ‘‘naming and shaming’’ strategy more
sophisticated, with more fine-grained comparisons and
rankings of business firms and practices. For instance,
based on a comprehensive set of criteria, the Swiss NGO
Berne Declaration classifies business firms operating in the
outdoor sports sector into three categories: summiteer
(superior performance), following (average performance)
and ignoramus (low performance) (Berne Declaration
2014). These developments indicate that differentiation
from the ‘‘inside,’’ where TGS participants compare their
CSR practices with their competitors, is supplemented by
differentiation from the ‘‘outside’’ (Overdevest 2010).
Importantly, in the context of the UNGC, the process of
differentiation and upward competition is endogenous to
this TGS’s system and stems from the social interaction
among UNGC participants and evaluators—the sanctioning
mechanism of an external regulator is not required (Haack
et al. 2013; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). In fact, as Haack
et al. (2013) have shown in a formal model of CSR insti-
tutionalization, imposing sanctions too early (i.e., before a
TGS has attracted a minimum degree of participation)
prevents business firms from ratcheting up their efforts,
which raises further doubts on the validity of the ‘‘strict
father’’ model of transnational governance. If both the
UNGC and its evaluators continue to classify participants
on the basis of their performance with respect to its prin-
ciples and publish reliable information on the ranking of
UNGC participants, ‘‘the resulting ‘soft’ sanctioning power
has the potential to alter corporate behavior in the long
run’’ (Baccaro and Mele 2011, p. 451).
Discussion
The main purpose of our paper was to theorize on the
deeper conceptual structure underlying the worldview of
evaluators of transnational governance, as well as to
appraise critically the validity of the assessments of the
UNGC and other TGSs that stem from these conceptual
structures. We have drawn on research in cognitive lin-
guistics to show that conceptions of transnational gover-
nance are organized around the family metaphor which
informs two diametrically opposed models of ‘‘educating’’
business firms that participate in TGSs, the strict father
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model and the nurturant parent model. Correspondingly,
we proposed that TGS evaluators can be categorized into
two groups: strict fathers, who stress the benefits of
strength and discipline, and nurturant parents, who
emphasize the pivotal role of care and empathy in
advancing the moral development of business firms. We
identified a fundamental tension underlying the strict father
ideal and explained that in contrast to the family context, in
transnational governance key actors hold heterogeneous
interests and expectations, and there is no centralized and
all-knowing authority to impose a single set of rules. Thus,
the strict father model may not offer appropriate guidelines
for TGSs and business regulation. In this final section, we
briefly discuss the paper’s contributions and outline pos-
sibilities for future research.
Contributions
The contribution of our article to the literature on the
UNGC and TGSs is twofold. First, we develop an account
on why the legitimacy of the UNGC is fundamentally
contested by proposing that the mindset of evaluators is
structured around the UNGC-as-family metaphor and that
they automatically apply this conceptual metaphor to judge
the UNGC and its activities. The family domain is the most
basic experience of evaluators with governance and is
therefore constitutive of other conceptual domains of
governance. In this view, the existing conceptual distinc-
tions of transnational governance (e.g., ‘‘hard law’’ vs.
‘‘soft law’’) and corporate governance (e.g., ‘‘compliance’’
vs. ‘‘integrity’’) are derived from, or at least informed by,
conceptions of idealized family models (‘‘strict father’’ vs.
‘‘nurturant mother’’) which, as we propose, are shared by
many evaluators. The benefit of specifying the UNGC-as-
family metaphor and applying it to the analysis of legiti-
macy in transnational governance lies in the disclosure of
the often tacit assumptions in the thinking and discourse of
‘‘first-order’’ evaluators. If our analysis is correct, extant
explanations and theories of transnational governance
ought to be reconsidered, as reasoning about transnational
governance is fundamentally metaphorical and often car-
ried out unconsciously, a proposition which is in line with
recent research on the heuristic foundation of social judg-
ment formation (Bitektine 2011; Haack et al. 2014;
Mishina et al. 2012).
Our second contribution lies in the critical analysis of
the assumptions and behavioral prescriptions of the strict
father model of transnational governance. Specifically, we
recommended that the solutions put forward by strict
fathers ought to be considered carefully. We showed that in
the context of transnational governance, the pivotal pre-
mise of the strict father model is problematic, namely that a
single authority can determine appropriate solutions to
complex policy challenges and that control and punishment
will support the implementation of CSR. In light of evi-
dence that high-entry barriers and rigorous enforcement
mechanisms in fact limit the implementation of CSR to a
small number of companies (Haack et al. 2012, 2013), we
argued that the strict father model of transnational gover-
nance undermines the very objectives it seeks to achieve.
We therefore advocated promoting the nurturant parent
model, with its focus on experimentation and learning. Our
position is that efforts to build and consolidate transna-
tional governance will only succeed when business actors
make sense of the disruption of profit-driven routines and
habits that societal demands for CSR causes, and when
unfamiliar and incomprehensible practices become mean-
ingful to these actors in a way that supports CSR behavior
and prompts them to enact these practices (Weick 1995). In
fact, the high-entry barriers and more rigorous enforcement
mechanisms that the ‘‘strict father’’ model envisions may
undercut experimentation, innovation and organizational
learning; slow down the institutionalization of CSR; or
limit it to a small number of organizational actors. In
contrast, through the process of moral entrapment und
upward competition, formal commitments—even if they
are hypocritical in the beginning—allow a large number of
business participants to learn about sustainability and
experiment with, embrace and enact a new way of con-
ducting business. Allowing laggards more time, providing
them with resources that will help them overcome orga-
nizational barriers and using the ‘‘soft’’ sanctioning power
of differentiation and public comparison can prove more
fruitful than using ‘‘the rod’’ that the strict father ideal
favors. Our article thus clarifies that evaluators need to
assess TGSs ‘‘not only on the basis of their appropriateness
at present, but what they might do to trigger a global ‘race
to the top’ at a later time’’ (Cashore et al. 2007, p. 158).
Ultimately, the ‘‘promise–performance gap’’ of the UNGC
can be seen as a necessary condition for CSR to take root
among the least ‘‘promising’’ business participants of TGSs
(Haack et al. 2013).
Future Research
The question whether the practice of greenwashing and
decoupling in business organizations is indeed transitory
and can lead to long-term changes is central to the current
debate on CSR (Christensen et al. 2013; Haack et al. 2012).
In the forward-looking nurturant parent model, action
(‘‘performance’’) follows from talk (‘‘promises’’). In other
words, communication that signals commitment to CSR
(such as pledging publicly to uphold the UNGC’s princi-
ples) can be seen as constitutive of behavioral change and
tighter coupling. From the nurturant parent’s point of view,
talk and action are inherently intertwined and not two
A Critique of the ‘‘Strict Father’’ Model 237
123
separate realms, as implied by the static analysis put for-
ward by Sethi and Schepers (2014).
Future research needs to further specify the boundary
conditions and dynamics under which the nurturant parent
model induces business firms to implement TGS principles.
As mentioned above, the processes of moral entrapment
and upward competition are likely to be moderated by the
costs of organizational change of the involved firm. How-
ever, if engagement with CSR becomes a widespread
phenomenon within one industry, the costs of adapting
organizational structures and procedures become a cost of
doing business and will not negatively affect the compet-
itive position of firms (Scherer et al. 2013).
In our view, the analysis of the role of public scrutiny in
influencing corporate CSR behavior will constitute an
important research frontier. As argued above, without the
critical gaze of society-at-large and public pressures to
enhance CSR performance, moral entrapment and upward
competition are unlikely to thrive, meaning that social
evaluation amounts to an important prerequisite for CSR to
become embedded in the structures and operations of
business firms. In the image of our central metaphor, by
acting as a collective judge rather than a centralized
authority, the public resumes the role of distantly related
‘‘uncles’’ or ‘‘second cousins’’ who in the context of the
larger ‘‘global family’’ watch the children and support the
parents in their child-rearing duties. By extension, corpo-
rate leaders in CSR implementation function as older
‘‘siblings’’ who help their less-advanced ‘‘brothers and
sisters’’ deal with the challenges of ‘‘adolescence’’ and also
act as an important conduit through which the pressure of
the larger family context is exerted. Hence, even though the
strict father is missing in transnational governance, the
demand for transparency and accountably is shared by the
larger family, that is, by the general public and the peers of
low-performing companies. This conceptual extension of
our basic metaphor is only partly compatible with the
prescriptions of the nurturant parent model of transnational
governance. The theoretical tension between strict father
and nurturant parent ideals can be solved by acknowledg-
ing that the proper moral development of children is a
multistage process and requires both nurturance and the
setting of rules. While in the first stages of its development,
the child should receive unconditional love and be able to
experiment with its surrounding, and subsequent stages
require that parents, with the support of other family
members, set rules and define ‘‘dos and don’ts’’ to ensure
that the child becomes a self-disciplined and autonomous
citizen. By analogy, the UNGC and other TGSs may
benefit from the careful and gradual tightening of TGS
requirements for business participants. Initially, a TGS
ought to embrace the instructions of the nurturant parent
ideal but eventually follow the prescriptions of the strict
father model, in this way maximizing the likelihood that
business firms increase their efforts in CSR implementa-
tion. Thus, it is possibly only in the blending of various
‘‘parenting styles’’ that we reveal a novel and promising
path to institutionalize CSR (Haack et al. 2013).
Conclusion
The common wisdom of ‘‘spare the rod, spoil the child’’ is
doubtful—indeed, there is vast evidence in research on
child development and child rearing that corporal punish-
ment is not an effective means of raising autonomous and
self-disciplined children but induces aggressiveness and
antisocial behavior (Greven 1991). By analogy, we have
argued that punitive approaches are often neither feasible
nor appropriate in the context of transnational governance
(Abbott and Snidal 2000; Rasche 2009; Scherer and
Palazzo 2011). We encourage Sethi and Schepers (2014)
and other adherents of the strict father metaphor to take
responsibility and explore more systematically the social
mechanisms underlying the institutionalization of CSR,
and to contribute to the development of a theory of trans-
national governance. If we do not put fundamentally dif-
ferent and potentially more effective models to the test and
specifying the boundary conditions under which the models
apply, we will never know whether the current setup in
transnational governance is indeed flawed or simply the
best that we can achieve in a complex world.
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